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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNIONJ
LOCAL 382, an unincorporated labor
organization, and CAROLINE
JOLLEY-CHRISTENSEN, an
individual,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,

Appeal No. 20020764-CA

vs.
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a
Utah incorporated special district,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Plaintiffs/Appellees (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Union")
believe that the Summary Judgment from which the Defendant/Appellant
(hereinafter the "UTA") have appealed is not sufficiently ripe for this Court to
have jurisdiction. The argument for lack of jurisdiction will be discussed below, in
Point I of the Argument.
Should the Summary Judgment be appealable, the Utah Supreme Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated. On November
5, 2003, pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme

Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Utah
Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah
Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Union is dissatisfied with how the UTA has presented the issues for
review. The Union does agree, however, with the UTA's statement as to the
standard of review for the issues. The Union also believes that the UTA did not
properly preserve Issues "A" and "B" as stated in Brief of Appellant. (See Brief of
Appellant, p. 1). The only reference to any argument on these two issues before the
District Court by the UTA was a couple of sentences during oral argument. (T.R.
17-18). Issue "A" was not ever described in the pleadings filed with the District
Court or in the Docketing Statement filed with this Court. Therefore, as an
alternative presentation of the issues for review, the Union presents the following:
1.

Is the Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate appealable pursuant

to Section 78-3 la-19, Utah Code Annotated? This issue is a matter of first
impressions for this Court. It was raised by the Union in a Motion to Dismiss
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction filed pursuant to Rule 10(a)(1), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Since it is a matter involving appellate jurisdiction, there is
no lower court ruling.

2.

Did the District Court correctly interpret Article 7, Paragraph A of the

Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties?
3.

Is the dispute over the reasons for the employee's termination a

genuine issue of material fact which would preclude the granting of summary
judgment?
4.

Did the Union satisfy the necessary conditions precedent before filing

its complaint to compel arbitration?
5.

Is the District Court's order compelling arbitration consistent with

Section 78-3 la-4, Utah Code Annotated?
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
AND RULES
In addition to Section 78-3 la-4, Utah Code Annotated, referred to in Brief of
Appellant, the Union believes that Section 78-3 la-19, Utah Code Annotated, is
also relevant. That statute reads as follows:
An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as provided by law
for appeals in civil actions from any court order:
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration;
(2) granting a motion to stay arbitration;
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an arbitration award;
(4) modifying or correcting an award; or
(5) vacating an award without directing rearbitration.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The Plaintiff/Appellee Caroline Jolley-Christensen (hereinafter either
"Christensen" or "employee") was a probationary employee of the
Defendant/Appellant Utah Transit Authority (hereinafter "UTA"). Christensen's
employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement between the UTA
and Plaintiff/Appellee Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382 (hereinafter
"Union").
The UTA terminated Christensen's employment. The Union and
Christensen sought to have the termination reviewed pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement. The UTA refused. Therefore, the Union and Christensen
filed a complaint with a district court seeking an order to arbitrate against the UTA.
B. Course of Proceedings Below and Disposition in Court Below
On December 15,2000, the Union and Christensen filed their complaint to
compel arbitration with the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah.
(C.R. 1-7). On February 10,2001, the UTA filed its answer generally denying the
legal premise of the Union's claim. (C.R. 10-15).
On May 2, 2002, the UTA and the Union filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. (C.R. 17-19,125-126). The motions were fully briefed and oral
arguments were held on August 20, 2002. (C.R. 225-226).

Following oral arguments, the Honorable Timothy R. Hansen, Third District
Court Judge, ruled from the bench, granting the Union's motion for summary
judgment and denied the UTA's motion for summary judgment. (C.R. 227). The
court's ruling compelled the parties to arbitrate issues surrounding Christensen's
termination of employment with the UTA. (C.R. 278-280). The District Court
entered a Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate, reflecting its ruling, on
September 5,2002. (C.R. 229-232). A true and correct copy of this Summary
Judgment is attached to the Brief of Appellant as Addendum "A". It is from this
Summary Judgment that the UTA filed its Notice of Appeal on September 19,
2002. (C.R. 246-251).
On September 30, 2002, the UTA filed a motion with the District Court to
stay the arbitration pending appeal. (C.R. 254-255). The motion was fully brief
and the matter was submitted to the court for decision. The court granted the
motion and stated its grounds in a minute entry dated January 21,2003. (C.R. 281282). An order reflecting the minute entry was entered on February 10, 2003.
(C.R. 284-285).
C. Statement of Facts
On April 28,1999, the Union and the UTA entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement for the term of December 11,1998 through December 10,
2003 (hereinafter referred to as "CBA"). (A full copy of the CBA is contained in

the record, C.R. 34-122, and its relevant portions are attached to the Brief of
Appellant as Addendum "B" and to this Brief as Addendum "A"). The most
relevant portion of CBA for this case is language which appears in Article 7,
Paragraph A and reads as follows:
All new employees shall be on probation until they have worked
one hundred ten (110) days. During such period, the Authority [UTA]
is the sole judge of ability, competency, fitness and qualifications to
perform work. This judgment shall not be subject to the grievance or
arbitration procedure. Otherwise, the Union shall have the right to
represent the employee.
(C.R. 36).
Christensen was a probationary employee with the UTA within the meaning
of the above quoted paragraph. On July 18, 2000, just prior to completion of her
probationary period of employment, the UTA terminated her employment. (C.R.
129). The UTA initially stated no reason for terminating Christensen's
employment. Notice of Christensen's termination of employment was received by
the Union on August 17, 2000. By letter dated August 24, 2000, the Union
requested a review of the termination pursuant to the terms of the CBA. (C.R.
143).
By letter dated August 31,2000, the UTA responded to the request of the
Union for review by stating the following:
This letter is in response to the request for discipline review,
received on August 24, concerning Operator Caroline Jolley-Christensen.
As you know, judgments made by the Authority concerning a

probationary employees "ability, competency, fitness and
qualifications to perform work" are not subject to the grievance and
arbitration procedure (Article 7, CBA). The holding of a discipline
review in this instance, then, would be contrary to our current collective
bargaining agreement.
(C.R. 144).
The Union subsequently learned that the UTA was then stating that
"attendance problems" were the reasons for Christensen's termination. By letter
dated September 1, 2000, the Union responded to the UTA, in part, as follows:
According to Toby Alires, Civil Rights Compliance Officer,
Ms. Jolley-Christensen was terminated for "attendance problems." The
way I see it, Ms. Jolley-Christensen was not terminated because of
ability, competency, fitness and/or qualifications to perform work, she
was terminated because of attendance problems. As such, Ms. JolleyChristensen falls in to the category of, "Otherwise the Union shall
have the right to represent the employee" which includes the
grievance and/or arbitration procedure.
(C.R. 191-192).
The Union believed that "attendance problems" must be a pretext for some
other unspecified reason for termination. There were three reasons for this belief:
1.

In the past, many probationary employees have been retained by the

UTA even though they had "attendance problems" more severe than Christensen.
2.

On July 7, 2000, Christensen's superior recommended that

Christensen be granted permanent employment with the UTA.
3.

Under the UTA's internal point system used to evaluate probationary

employees, Christensen was within standards for permanent employment.

(C.R. 130,146,233-236).
The reasons, or lack thereof, for the termination of Christensen's
employment with the UTA are in dispute between the parties. (C.R. 157-159).
However, the UTA has been consistent in its position, that it does not matter what
reasons it had for terminating Christensen's employment, the termination is not
subject to review under its CBA. (C.R. 161-167). Therefore, it was not surprising
when the UTA sent to the Union on September 8, 2000 a letter again denying the
contractual right of Christensen to have her termination of employment reviewed.
(C.R. 145).
As a result, the Union and Christensen filed their complaint with the Third
Judicial District Court. The lower court ruled in favor of the Union and
Christensen. This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal should be dismissed, without prejudice, because the Summary
Judgment and Order to Arbitrate is not an appealable order within the meaning of
Section 78-3 la-19, Utah Code Annotated.
If the Order to Arbitrate is appealable, this Court should affirm the Summary
Judgment since the District Court correctly held that Article 7, Paragraph A of the
parties' collective bargaining agreement was clear and unambiguous and requires
the disputed facts surrounding the termination of Christensen's employment to be

arbitrated. The dispute as to the reasons for Christensen's termination is one of the
grounds for granting summary judgment.
Further, the Union complied with the relevant requirements of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement before the Union field the complaint to compel
arbitration against the UTA. Finally, the District Court's Order to Arbitrate is
consistent with the requirements of Section 78-3 la-4, Utah Code Annotated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE ORDER TO ARBITRATE IS NOT APPEALABLE
PURSUANT TO U.C.A § 78-31a-19.

Whether an order to compel arbitration, which otherwise may be a final
order, is appealable pursuant to Section 78-3 la-19, Utah Code Annotated, prior to
the parties arbitrating their dispute, is an issue of first impression with the Utah
courts. Although it is one of the first impressions, it is a subject that has been
litigated a great deal around the nation. In fact, there is an excellent annotation of
the cases on this subject entitled "Appealability of State Court's Order or Decree
compelling or Refusing to Compel Arbitration" by David B. Harrison, J.D., 6
A.L.R. 4th 652.
As a general rule, appellate courts seem to hold that orders compelling
arbitration are not final orders from which an appeal may be taken. However, in
the case at hand, the Union would have to agree with the statement made by the

UTA in its Docketing Statement, p.2, that the subject order compelling arbitration
is a final order.
The reason for the Union's view that the subject Order to Arbitrate is a final
order is because the Union was granted by the District Court full relief and no
issues remain unresolved with the District Court. Further, often orders to compel
arbitration are accompanied with an order staying further court proceedings, until
such time as the arbitrator rules. In the case at hand, there were no collary court
proceedings to stay. Thus, the Union believes that the best view is that the subject
Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate was a final order.
The traditional view is that an aggrieved party has the right to appeal to the
appropriate appellate court any adverse final judgment. However, a sensitive
reading of the law demonstrates that such a right to appeal is not absolute.
The starting point for determining whether or not the UTA has a right to
appeal the adverse ruling of the District Court is, of course, Rule 3(a), Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
An appeal may be taken from the district or juvenile court to
the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders
and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice
of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by
Rule 4. [Emphasis added].
The very wording of Rule 3(a) clearly notes that the law may provide that
some final orders are not appealable as a matter of right. For example, in criminal

in

cases, the state does not have a right to appeal acquittals. See State v. Chugg, 749
p. 2d 1279 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). In small claims cases,finaljudgments following a
trial de novo are only subject to limited rights to appeal. Section 78-6-10(2), Utah
Code Annotated. It is the Union's view that the Utah legislature has limited the
right of the UTA to appeal an order to compel arbitration.
In the present case, the enforceability of the arbitration clause contained in
the CBA is covered by the Utah Arbitration Act; Sections 78-3 la-1, et. seq., Utah
Code Annotated. That act contains a set of procedures for obtaining a court
interpretation of arbitration clauses, including the appeal rights of the parties bound
by those interpretations. Section 78-3la-19, Utah Code Annotated, reads in its
entirety, as follows:
An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as provided by law
for appeals in civil actions from any court order:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

denying a motion to compel arbitration;
granting a motion to stay arbitration;
confirming or denying confirmation of an arbitration award;
modifying or correcting an award; or

(5)

vacating an award without directing rearbitration.

The above quoted statute must be the basis for any appeal sought by the
UTA herein. However, the state legislature specifically excluded from the
enumerated appealable orders, an order "granting a motion to compel arbitration."
It must be presumed by the courts that such legislative exclusion was intentional.

In a recent decision, this Court hinted at why the Utah legislature may have
deliberately excluded certain orders under the Utah Arbitration Act from the right
to appeal. In Cade v. Zions First National Bank, 956 P. 2d 1073 (Utah App 1998),
a former employee of the bank filed a complaint in District Court alleging that he
was wrongfully discharged from his employment with the bank. The bank filed a
motion to compel arbitration with the Court pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act.
The Court granted the bank's motion and the parties went to binding arbitration.
Following a favorable ruling from the arbitrator, the bank file a motion with the
District Court to confirm the arbitration awarded. The Court confirmed the award
and the employee appealed pursuant to the above quoted Section 78-3la-19(3),
Utah Code Annotated.
On appeal, the employee challenged the trial court's initial granting of the
order to arbitrate, just as the UTA is now challenging the District Court's order.
The bank responded to that challenge by arguing that the employee had waived his
right to appeal the order compelling arbitration when he failed to immediately
appeal that order at the time the order had been granted. This Court rejected the
bank's argument by stating:
Utah courts have not yet addressed the legal standard that courts must
apply to determine whether a party has waived its right to challenge an
arbitration order or award. However, we cannot agree that Cade's decision
to withhold further challenge until after the arbitration proceeding
constituted a waiver of his right to do so.
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Courts from other jurisdictions have repeatedly held that orders
compelling arbitration and staying the underlying action are not final orders
and thus are not immediately appealable. See Wiepking v. Prudential-Bache
Sec.,Inc., 940 F.2d 996, 999 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Plaintiffs did not waive their
right to appeal the district court's order simply because they did what the
court ordered them to do."); Jolley v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,
867 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1989); Pioneer Properties, Inc. v. Martin, 116
F.2d 888,890 (10th Circ. 1985).
Such a conclusion is consistent with Utah's "long-standing public
policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicated disputes."
Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996)
(citation omitted). "One hesitates to contemplate the avalanche of motions
for discretionary review that would burden the courts if parties were required
to seek this relief from clearly interlocutory orders to forfeit their right to
appeal the matter when the litigation is concluded." Wiepking, 940 F.2d at
1000.
956P.2datl080.
The Utah legislature has recently revisited the Utah Arbitration Act with
several significant amendments. Effect May 15, 2003, Section 78-3la-129, Utah
Code Annotated, which will replace Section 78-3la-19, reads as follows:
(1)

An appeal may be taken from:
(a) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration;
(b) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration;
(c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(d) an order modifying or correcting an award;
(e) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(f)
afinaljudgment entered pursuant to this chapter.

(2)

An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a
judgment in a civil action. [Emphasis added].

If the parties' had a new CBA, it is obvious that the Utah legislature would
permit the UTA to take the type of appeal which the UTA now seeks. The

legislature by their act of amending the statute have demonstrated their belief that
the Utah Arbitration Act, covering the current CBA, does not permit the UTA to
appeal the present Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate.
Just because the UTA does not have the right to appeal the current Order to
Arbitrate, it does not mean the order is not subject to appellate review. The UTA
could seek a review pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such
a request by the UTA might be problematic because the current Order to Arbitrate
is not an interlocutory order. However, the same policy discussions normally
involved whether or not this Court should grant an interlocutory appeal would be
extremely relevant in any discretionary appeal right the UTA may currently have.
Additionally, the UTA could clearly seek a review of the order in the same
manner that the Zion's Bank employee did in the above cited Cade case. After an
arbitration hearing and ruling in the case at hand, the UTA could appeal to the
Utah Supreme Court following a District Court order either confirming, denying,
or modifying the arbitration decision. The Cade case clearly holds that such an
appellate review is appropriate.
A central argument of the UTA on this issue is that, regardless of the
wording of Sections 78-31 a-1, et seq. Utah Code Annotated; Section 5 of Article
VIII of the Utah Constitution guarantees UTA's right of appeal in the case at hand.
(See Utah Transit Authority's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion to
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Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction, dated November 2,2002, filed with the
Utah Supreme Court). However, it is the Union's view that UTA is misapplying
the Utah Constitution.
First, and most importantly, the Union believes that the UTA does have the
right to appeal the ruling of the District Court. However, the right of the UTA to
appeal has yet to ripen. As described above, the UTA would have an absolute right
to appeal only after the ordered arbitration has been concluded. Such a view would
be consistent with the "long-standing public policy" of encouraging parties to
arbitrate their disputes; rather than litigate in Court. Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake
Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah, 1996). Therefore, should this Court accept the
Union's interpretation of Section 78-3 la-19, that interpreted would be consistent
with the UTA's interpretation of the Utah Constitution.
Second, Section 5 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution is not an absolute
grant of a right to appeal in all cases. Past case law interpreting that section, or its
predecessors, enumerated a number of appropriate limitations on the right of
appeal. For example, in State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah, 1977), the Court
reaffirmed the view that, in spite of the wording contained in the Utah
Constitution, the state does not have the right to appeal certain adverse sentences in
criminal cases. The Court specifically held that the right of appeal could be limited
by statute.

In Kanab v. Gushev, 965 P.2d 1065 (Utah Crt App. 1998) this Court held
that this Court may limit the constitutional right of appeal by court promulgated
rules pursuant to its authority granted under Section 4 of Article VIII of the Utah
Constitution. Therefore, the limitation on appeals as argued by the Union and as
established in Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, are perfectly
constitutional.
Since the constitutional right of appeal can be limited (not eliminated) by
both legislative statute or court rule, dismissing the UTA's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction does not violate Section 5 of Article VII of the Utah Constitution.
The UTA also argues that Section 78-2-2(3), Utah Code Annotated,
mandates an appeal right. This is incorrect. That statute holds that, if there is an
appeal, then the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction. And, the Union concurs
that, if there is to be an appeal in this matter, the Utah Supreme Court would have
had jurisdiction.
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, reads in its entirety as follows:
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over.. .orders, judgments and
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does
not have original appellate jurisdiction... [Emphasis added]
Clearly, that statue is a grant of appellate jurisdiction over both appeals by right
and appeals by discretion of the court. The purpose of the statute is to designate an
appellate court, not to grant a right of appeal.
16

This Court should dismiss this appeal, without prejudice, and permit the
parties to proceed with the ordered arbitration.
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED ARTICLE
7, PARAGRAPH A OF THE CBA.
The gravaman of this case has been the different legal interpretations of
Article 7, Paragraph A of the CBA. The UTA has consistently argued that the
clear, unambiguous language of that paragraph grants to the UTA absolute
discretion in whether or not to terminate the employment of any of its probationary
employees. (See Point IV of UTA's argument in its Brief of Appellant, pp 23-29).
The Union has consistently argued that, although the language of the CBA grants
broad discretion to the UTA, the clear, unambiguous language of the subject
paragraph does not grant the UTA absolute discretion in terminating probationary
employees. That discretion of the UTA is limited to the probationary employee's
"work performance". (C.R. 201).
Both parties agree that the language of the CBA must be the starting point
for any analysis. Again, the critical language reads as follows:
All new employees shall be on probation until they have worked one
hundred ten (110) days. During such period, the Authority [UTA] is the sole
judge of ability, competency, fitness and qualifications to perform work.
This judgment shall not be subject to the grievance or arbitration procedure.
Otherwise, the Union shall have the right to represent the employee.
In its analysis of that paragraph, the UTA emphasizes the phrases "the
Authority [UTA] is the sole judge" and "This judgment shall not be subject to the

grievance or arbitration procedure." In the Union's analysis of that same
paragraph, the Union emphasizes "to perform work" and "Otherwise, the Union
shall have the right to represent the employee."
The parties also agree on the law of contract language interpretation. The
Utah Supreme Court, in a recent case set forth that law clearly when it stated:
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling.
Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, If 13, 987 P.2d 48 (quotation
omitted). "[W]e first look to the four corners of the agreement to determine
the intentions of the parties." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist,
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); see <Aso Reed v. Davis Co. Sch. Dist, 892
P.2d 1063, 1064-1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). If the language within the four
corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are
determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law. Dixon, 1999 UT 89 at f 14,
987 P.2d 48 (citing WillardPease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co.,
899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995)). If the language within the four corners of
the contract is ambiguous, however, extrinsic evidence must be looked to in
order to determine the intentions of the parties. Id. In evaluating whether
the plain language is ambiguous, we attempt to harmonize all of the
contract's provisions and all of its terms. Id.; see also Buehner Block Co. v.
UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). "An ambiguity exists where
the language 'is reasonably capable of being understood in more than one
sense.'" Dixon, 1999 UT 89 at f 14, 987 P.2d 48 (quoting R&R Energies v.
Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Utah 1997) (further
quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we first look to the plain language within
the four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties...
Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Park West Assocs., 40 P.3d 599,605 (Utah
2002).
The Union had argued before the District Court that harmonizing the
different emphasis of the contract language by the two parties was properly the role
of a labor arbitrator. (See Reply memorandum in Support of Union's Motion for
18

Summary Judgment. C.R. 215-221). The District Court rejected that argument and
ruled that Article 7, Paragraph A of the CBA was unambiguous and that the
Union's interpretation was correct. (TR. 43-46).
The Union interpreted the subject paragraph to mean that, should the UTA
terminate a probationary employee for non-work performance reasons, that
termination is reviewable and grievable. This interpretation is consistent and in
harmony with all the words of the subject paragraph. The UTA's interpretation of
the same paragraph requires the elimination of several words from the CBA. This
is admitted in footnote 4 on page 27 of Brief of Appellant, which reads as follows:
For the same reasons, the Trial Court's focus on the phrase "to
perform work" in the second sentence is unreasonable. Surely, the
contracting parties did not carefully script the second sentence to grant
extensive discretion to UTA regarding probationary employees, only to see
that discretion so easily quashed by conjecture that UTA's judgment was not
based on work performance. Instead, it is far more reasonable to conclude
that the parties intended to exclude all probationary employee terminations
from review, rather than carve out an exception that swallows the rule.
Under the case law, cited by both parties, it is inappropriate for the courts to ignore
language specifically written into a contract.
The UTA, now on appeal, seems to recognize its analytical problem by
arguing that, since there are two reasonable alternative interpretations of Article 7,
Paragraph A of the CBA, there must be an ambiguity in the CBA that prevents the
granting of summary judgment. (See Brief of Appellant, pp. 30-31).

There are several problems with the UTA's argument. First, it is a complete
departure from anything they have argued before the District Court. The UTA
presented no factual evidence as to any parties' intent in the drafting of the
language of Article 7, Paragraph A other than the language itself. Second, the
UTA's "reasonable alternative interpretation" still requires this Court to ignore
specific language of the CBA. In all of the argument, it cannot be denied that the
phrase "ability, competency, fitness and qualification to perform work", although
broad, is not all encompassing. The UTA's broad discretion over terminating
probationary employees is specifically limited by the language of the parties'
agreement. Finally, if there is an ambiguity in the CBA, that ambiguity should be
resolved by a labor arbitrator. As stated above, the Union specifically argued this
point before the District Court.
The District Court appropriately held that the only way the harmonize all the
language of Article 7, Paragraph A, was to adopt the Union's interpretation of that
clause. The Union presented the only unambiguous, clear interpretation. The
District Court's interpretation should be affirmed.
POINT III: DISPUTE OVER THE REASONS FOR TERMINATING THE
EMPLOYMENT OF CHRISTENSEN IS NOT GROUNDS FOR
DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Union presented evidence to the District Court why it believed the
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Stated grounds for Christensen's termination was a pretext. The UTA has never
stated any reason for Christensen's termination other than "attendance problems".
The UTA strongly disagrees with the Union's factual representation. Obviously,
there is a classic factual dispute.
The UTA argues that such a factual dispute precludes the granting of
summary judgment. (See Brief of Appellant pp 18-23). However, the UTA has
the argument exactly backwards. The existence of this dispute is why there must
be an order to compel arbitration; an arbitrator must resolve this factual dispute.
If the UTA were successful with this argument, it would mean that the
Union would have to litigate the factual basis of the pretextual dismissal twice.
First, the Union would have to interview and obtain testimony from all the
witnesses and present that evidence to the District Court. The Union would then
have to convince the District Court that the weight of all the evidence was that the
employee was terminated for non-work performance reasons. Such an argument
would probably require a trial. Second, if the Union was successful at trial before
the District Court, the Union would have to retry the case before an arbitrator, so
an arbitrator can impose appropriate remedies under the CBA.
The whole public policy behind encouraging parties to arbitrate their
disputes is to avoid the expense and duplicative efforts which would be the result
of adoption of the UTA's argument. Although federal law is not controlling in this

matter, there is a great deal of federal case law discussing the value of encouraging
labor arbitration. In federal labor law, the guidelines for requiring arbitration are
described as follows:
(1) a party cannot be forced to arbitrate any dispute that it has not
obligated itself by contract to submit to arbitration; (2) unless the parties
clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, whether a collective bargaining
agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate a particular grievance is
an issue for judicial determination; (3) in making this determination, a court
is not to consider the merits of the underlying claim; and (4) where the
agreement contains an arbitration clause, the court should apply a
presumption of arbitrability, resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration, and
should not deny an order to arbitrate "unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute." Moreover, in cases involving broad
arbitration clauses the Court has found the presumption of arbitrability
"particularly applicable," and only an express provision excluding a
particular grievance from arbitration or "the most forceful evidence of a
purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail."
United Steelworks v. Mead Corp. 21 F.3d 128, 131 (6th Cir. 1994).
It is interesting that not once in the UTA's argument does it speak to the
virtues and values behind encouraging labor arbitration. The UTA seems to want
all the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement, but none of the
responsibilities imposed by a broad arbitration clause.
This Court should reject the UTA's argument that the Union must litigate
the factual basis of Christensen's claim twice.
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POINT IV: THE UNION SATISFIED THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS
PRIOR TO FILING ITS COMPLAINT.
The UTA is now arguing that the Union did not file the appropriate
"grievance" under the CBA in order for the District Court to have jurisdiction to
order arbitration. Although this was a mere side argument before the lower court,
the UTA has elevated this argument to Point I of its Brief. (See Brief of Appellant,
pp9-17).
The procedures for review of employee discipline, including termination of
employment, are spelled out in Articles 12 and 13 of the CBA. Partial copies of
these articles are attached to the UTA's Brief. (See Brief of Appellant, Appendix
"B"). A complete copy is attached to this Brief as Exhibit "A". Article 12
provides that the Union and the aggrieved employee must within eleven (11) days
of receiving notice of the termination, file a "request for review" with the UTA's
Human Resources Department. There is no dispute between the parties that
Christensen and the Union complied with this requirement with its letter dated
August 24, 2000.
The UTA responded with a letter stating quite clearly that Christensen's
termination is not "reviewable" under the CBA. The exact words of the letter
were,".. .judgment made by its Authority [UTA] concerning a probationary
employee's 'ability, competency, fitness, and qualifications to perform work' are
not subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures..." [Emphasis added], A

week later, and after a written rebuttal from the Union, the UTA again by letter
stated that Christensen's termination was not "subject to the grievance process."
(C.R. 144-145).
The UTA now argues that it was necessary for the Union to go through the
futile gesture of filing grievances and requests for arbitration with the UTA, after
the UTA had already, twice in writing, stated that the dispute was not subject to the
grievance and arbitration processes of the parties' CBA. It is traditional labor law
that the courts will not require the parties to go through meaningless actions before
seeking relief from the courts. This is consistent with traditional contract law
which also governs arbitration agreements. Hansen v. Dean Witter, 537 U.S. 79
(2002). If the parties to a collective bargaining agreement have repudiated the
established grievance procedure, an aggrieved party may seek court relief. United
Food and Commercial Works v. Safeway Stores, 889 F.2d 940 (10th Cir.1989). If
the grievance process would be wholly futile, the parties to an agreement may seek
judicial relief. Ritza v. International Longshoremen, 837 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1988).
Also, if the grievance process is too hostile, inadequate to provide sufficient relief,
or likely to delay opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits, the parties
to an agreement may seek court relief without going through the meaningless steps
of the grievance process. Clayton v. International Union, 451 U.S. 679 (1981).

It was absolutely clear by the UTA's response to the Union's request to
review Christensen's termination that any further use of the grievance and
arbitration process of the parties' CBA would be a futile waste of time. This is a
classic exception to the traditional need to exhaust contractual procedures prior to
seeking judicial relief.
The irony of the UTA's argument is that the desired relief requested by the
Union is to proceed with the contractual processes. This Court should affirm the
order to compel arbitration.
POINT V: THE ORDER TO ARBITRATE COMPLIES WITH U.C.A. § 78-3 la4(i).
Section 78-31a-4(i), Utah Code Annotated, reads as follows:
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope
of the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those
issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly. [Emphasis added].
Clearly, the scope of the matters covered by the arbitration clause of the CBA has
been the central debate between the Union and the UTA. The District Court
resolved this dispute by bifurcating the factual disputes of the parties into two
separate questions for an arbitrator. First, the arbitrator would decide the factual
issues surrounding why Christensen was terminated. Second, should the arbitrator
determine that Christensen was terminated for non-work performance reasons, the
arbitrator would decide the appropriate contracted remedies for resolving

Christensen's termination. It is clear from the UTA's Brief that it objects to the
District Court's bifurcation of the arbitrator's role. (See Brief of Appellant, pp 1718). However, counsel for the Union is not clear on the reasons for the UTA's
objection. (This matter was not argued before the District Court).
It appears that the UTA is objecting to the Order to Arbitrate because it
requires the arbitrator to determine whether or not he has jurisdiction to arbitrate.
This concept is often called the "arbitration of arbitrability". The problem with the
UTA's objection is that, whether or not Christensen's termination is reviewable,
turns on the factual nature of her termination. That factual finding must be done
by an arbitrator.
It is the Union's reading of the Utah Arbitration Act that the District Court
did exactly what was required under the above quoted language of the Act to
properly focus the arbitration on what was at issue, the termination of
Christensen's employment by the UTA.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the District Court's Summary Judgment and Order
to Arbitrate and permit the parties to arbitrate their dispute.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 2004.

Joseph E. Hatch
Attorney for Appellees
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ADDENDUM
Articles 11, 12, 13,14, and 15 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
between Utah Transit Authority and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local
382.

4
^tSTro^ discharged-for other roagons, shall be granted a leave of absence.*
l

3

ARTICLE 11 NOTICE OF DISCIPLINE

4

Employees shall be advised of any discipline or charges within eleven (11) calendar days

5

after the General Manager of the Authority or its designees have knowledge of any alleged

6

violation of Authority rules or other offenses. Oral warnings may be given, or the employee shall

7

be furnished a written statement of the offense or discipline. The written statement shall include

8

a description of the actions or behavior in which the employee is alleged to have engaged. Such

9

statement shall be sufficiently precise and complete so that the employee may be able to identify

10

the actions or behavior to which reference is made. For the purposes of this Article, persons who

11

have been retained to monitor service and performance shall be deemed designees of the General

"* 2

Manager. Also, with respect to discipline for chargeable accidents, the time period under this

13

Article shall commence to run when the Accident Review Committee's report is received and

14

time-stamped in the Risk Management Department of the Authority. A copy of the time-stamped

15

report shall be furnished to the Union.

16
17

ARTICLE 12: SUSPENSION OR DISCHARGE

18

A prompt review shall be made in any situation where discharge or other discipline is

19

contemplated or has been administered, provided request for such review is made in writing to

20

the Human Resources Department within eleven (II) calendar days following notice by the

21

Authority to the Union that discharge or discipline may be involved. If no request is made to the

22

Authority within that time, and the discharge or discipline is administered by the Authority, such
7
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with or without back pay as deemed justified by the facts and evidence.
If either party fails to meet the above time limits, the other party may automatically move
the matter to the next step in the procedure or arbitration. If a matter is not appealed by the
Union to the next step in a timely manner, it shall be deemed resolved on the basis of the last
answer; provided, however, that if the Authority fails to meet any of the time deadlines and the
Union carries the matter to the next step, the Authority shall pay to the Union a penalty of S400.

ARTICLED: PROCEDURE FOR GRIEVANCES
The term "grievance", shall mean a complaint and/or dispute by the Union and/or
3

employee concerning the proper interpretation or application of any provision of this Agreement.

1

FIRST STEP: All grievances should first be discussed with the immediate

2

supervisor who should be advised of the particular section of the agreement that is involved. The

3

Union and the Authority agree that it is in the best interest of all parties to settle the dispute at

4
5
6
.7
.8

this stage. If not resolved in that discussion, or if other circumstances warrant, the Union or the
employee may fill out a grievance form provided by the Authority. The grievance form must be
submitted in 'writing to the Human Resources Department within eleven (11) calendar days after
the incident giving rise to the grievance is known to exist. Grievances in the Mount Ogden and
Timpanogos Divisions may be filed with the Operations Division Manager's office.

.9

STEP TWO: Within seven (7) calendar days following the filing of a grievance,

!0

the Human Resources Department will investigate the facts and evidence giving rise to the

>l
>2

grievance and shall give to the Union a written answer to the grievance.
STEP THREE: If the grievance is not satisfactorily resolved by the Step Two-

1

answer, or if the answer is not provided within the time allowed, the Union may appeal the matter

2

to Step Three within seven (7) calendar days by filing a written appeal with the Human

3

Resources Department. At Step Three, the matter shall be submitted to the GRC which shall

4

attempt to settle the matter by using the Collaborative process.

5

STEP FOUR: If the matter is not settled by the GRC within twenty-one (21)

6

days after the Step Two answer, the Union may recuest arbitration under Article 14, provided

7

such request is made within twenty-eight (28) calendar days after the Step Two answer. The

8

selected arbitrator shall review the same facts and evidence as were presented before the GRC

9

together with any new facts and evidence subsequently discovered and promptly brought to the

10

attention of the other party and shall then either sustain, modify or rescind that decision as

11

deemed justified by the facts and evidence.

12

If the Authority fails to meet any of the above time limits prior to the appeal for

13

arbitration, the Union may automatically move the matter to the next step of the grievance

14

procedure; provided, that if the Union moves the matter to the next step, the Authority shall also

15

pay the Union a penalty of S400.

16
17

A R T I C L E 14: A R B I T R A T I O N P R O C E D U R E S

L8

Only grievances which have been timely processed by the Union through t h e grievance

L9

steps in Article 12 o r 13 and which allege a violation of this Agreement (including a claim alleging

10

unjust suspension or termination) may be carried to arbitration. Reasonable extensions to the

1

time limits set forth in Articles 12 through 14 shall be granted upon advance request by either

2

party.

10

All reasonable efforts should be made to avoid the expense and trouble of arbitration.
Within thirty-five (35) calendar days of request for arbitration, the parties shall either agree upon
3

an arbitrator or shall give notice of selection to the arbitrator who is next in order on the

4

expedited list of arbitrators existing as of the date of this Agreement. During the term of this

5

Agreement, either party may exercise one peremptory challenge to any arbitrator on the expedited

6

panel. If an arbitrator is removed by such challenge or by mutual agreement, a replacement shall

7

be selected by requesting a panel of names from the Federal Mediation Service. Seven (7)

8

calendar days after receipt of such panel the parties shall select the replacement arbitrator by

9

alternately striking names from the panel with the first strike determined by lot. Extensions of up

.0

to seven (7) calendar days may be granted for either party if written or verbal request is made

LI

within forty-eight (48) hours of the original deadline. If the Union fails timely to select an

{

arbitrator, the grievance shall be deemed withdrawn.

2
3

Both, parties shall reduce to writing their agreed positions with respect to facts, evidence,

14

and issues, and any disputed facts, evidence or issues. In discipline or discharge cases, no

15

transcripts or post-hearing briefs shall be used unless requested by the Union, and the decision

16

of the arbitrator shall be rendered within five (5) calendar days. In other cases, transcripts and

17

post-hearing briefs may be omitted by mutual agreement, and a time limit for decision may be set

18

by mutual agreement

19

The arbitrator shall have no power to change this Agreement nor to impose any terms or

20

conditions the arbitrator might think the parties should have agreed upon. The arbitrator's power

21

is limited to finding the facts and to applying the terms of this Agreement to those facts. The

22

Union and the Authority shall equally share the expense and charges of the arbitrator. The
11

<ji me arbitrator shall be final and binding upon all parties.
2
3
4

ARTICLE 15: LEAVES
A.

OKABSENCE

Leaves of absence without pay or fringe benefits shall be granted for gooel and

5

sufficient reasons for periods of up to ninety (90) days. All leaves of absence must be approved

6

in writing before commencing such leave. The Authority may refuse to grant leaves/of absence

7

for good ca\ise, but will not arbitrarily refuse leaves. Leaves longer than ninety 00) days must

8

be approved dy both the Authority and the Union, except for military leave, which shall be

9

granted in accordance with applicable laws.

.10
11
12

B.

Employees elected or appointed to full-time Union off/ce shall be granted leave

of absence.
C.

Employees returning from leaves of absence/shall return to their original

13

classification and may exercise seniority to take the least senior shift or regular run but otherwise

14

shall bid for assignment on the nexrvregular change or bid day. Time on leave is not considered

15

time worked for any purpose except seniority, which continues to accumulate during leaves of

16

less than ninety (90) days, military leaves oiSleaves longer than ninety (90) days as approved by

17

both parties, essentially for long term illness/

18

D.

Employees who are eligible for anckhave enrolled in the medical insurance

19

program, and who take a leave of absence from the AuthVity, and who waive benefit coverage

20

while on a leave, will be reinstated to the insurance program on the first day of the month

21

following their return to worfc provided they have given the Authority at least 30 days' advance

22

notice of their return from leave of absence and they actually return, on the specified day.

